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Democracy and Delegation of Legislative Authority: Bob Jones University v. United
States'
These men believed that democracy was a political contrivance by which the
group conflicts inevitable in all society should find a relatively harmless outlet
in the give and take of legislative compromise .... They had no illusion that
the outcome would necessarily be the best obtainable, certainly not that which
they might themselves have personally chosen; but the political stability of
such a system, and the possible enlightenment. which the battle itself' might
bring, were worth the price.
Learned Hand'
Congress has delegated to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the task of administer-
ing the Internal Revenue Code. 3 Section 5 0 1(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
grants tax-exempt status to various types of organizations'' including nonprofit educa-
tional institutions. Under section 170 of the Code, gifts to these organizations are tax
deductible.' Until 1970, these tax advantages were accorded to private schools through-
out the country regardless of whether the schools discriminated on the basis of race." In
' 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
▪ Hand, Chief:Justice Stone's Conception of the judicial Function, 46 CoLum. L. REV. 646, 697 (1946).
• Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 596.
• I.R.C. § 501(a) (Law. Co -op. 1974) provides: "(a) Exemption from taxation. An organization
described in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall he exempt from taxation under this subtitle
unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503. - I.R.C. § 501(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983)
lists twenty-three categories of tax exempt organizations. Section 501(c)(3), the category pertinent to
this note, provides an exemption for:
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, liter-
ary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities
or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
§ 501(c)(3) (Law. Co -op. Stipp. 1983).
I.K.C. § 502 (Law. Co-op. 1974) provides that corporations operated for profit whose profits are
payable to organizations exempt under section 501 are not therefore exempt themselves. I.R.C. §
503 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) operates to deny tax exempt status to organizations engaging in
specified prohibited transactions.
5 I.R.C. § 170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983). This provision allows for charitable contributions to be
deducted from gross income. Id. Section 170(c)(2) defuses "charitable contribution" as a gift for the
use of:
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation —
(B) Organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(hut only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equip-
ment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals:
(C) No part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual .
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983). In addition, subpart (D) adds the requirement that
organizations receiving charitable contributions not engage in prohibited political lobbying. 1.R.C. §
170(c)(2)(D).
" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 577-78.
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1970, however, in the face of a preliminary injunction restraining the IRS From granting
these tax advantages to discriminatory private schools in Mississippi,' the IRS revised its
policy to prevent discriminatory schools from obtaining tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3). 8 Concurrently, the IRS announced that gifts to such institutions could not be
deducted as charitable contributions under section 170. 9 The IRS notified private schools
of this change in policy.'" After a district court made permanent the injunction regarding
the grant of tax-exempt status to Mississippi schools," the IRS formalized its policy
denying these tax benefits to discriminatory schools throughout the nation. IS Subse-
quently, the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the permanent injunction
issued by the district court regarding Mississippi schools.'
The IRS actions denying tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools were not
based on the express requirements of sections 501(c)(3) or 170, but on a public benefit
requirement it found implicit in those sections." The IRS's reasoning raises the question
whether, under sections 501(c)(3) and 170, Congress had delegated or could delegate to
the IRS the task of determining whether ostensibly charitable organizations provide a
public benefit worthy of tax-exempt status. t5 The Court has long recognized that certain
delegations of congressional authority to administrative agencies are impermissible be-
cause of their inconsistency with the system of government established by the Constitu-
tion.'" While this delegation doctrine retains its theoretical validity, the Court has only
infrequently used it to invalidate or limit congressional delegations to administrative
agencies.'
Bob Jones University v. United Staler was the first case in which the Supreme Court
expressly addressed the legitimacy of the denial of tax benefits to racially discriminatory
private schools by the IRS.'s Bob Jones arose when, in 1976, the IRS determined that Bob
Jones University did not provide a public benefit worthy of tax-exempt status due to its
racially discriminatory policies and revoked its tax-exempt st atus. 19 The case was heard by
• See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), app. dismissed sub. nom. Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
• See Devins, Tax Exemption For Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: A Legislative Proposal. 20
Hitkv. J. ON 1.,EGi5. 138, 156 (1983); see also I.R.S. News Releases, 7 STAND. FED. TAN Rio', (CCH) ¶
6790 (July. 10, 1970); id.	 6814 (July 19, 1970).
• I.R.S. News Releases, 7 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) 6790 (July 10, 1970); id.' 6814 (July
19, 1970).
'" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 578.
" See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1 179 (D.D.C.), summarily aff'd sob. nom. Coil v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 	 .
u Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; see also Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834 (requiring
private schools to publicize their nondiscriminatory policies and providing guidelines for the publica-
tion of their policies).
" Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
" Bob Jones. 461 U.S. at 585-86.
' 5 See infra notes 283-336 and accompanying text
'" See infra notes 101-149 and accompanying text.
17 See id.
th Although the Court had the opportunity to expressly determine the legitimacy of the IRS's
denial of tax exempt status to racially discriminatory schools in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150
(D.D.C. 1971), summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), the Court's summary
affirmance precluded such a discussion. Subsequently, the Court noted the Court's affirmance in
Green lacks that precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary controversy." Bob Jones
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.11 (1974).
19 See Rob Jones, 461 U.S. at 581, 591-92.
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the Supreme Court together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, which also
involved the denial of tax-exempt status to a discriminatory private school." In its opinion
in Bob Jones, the Supreme Court treated these two cases together.' The Court upheld the
IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to both of these institutions. 22 Both the concurring and
dissenting justices in Bob Jones, however, raised concerns which prevented them from
finding that the IRS had been delegated the authority to make such determinations
regarding tax exemption. 23
Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in South Carolina which
operates a school attended by approximately 5,000 students, from kindergarten through
graduate school." The school is dedicated to the teaching of fundamentalist Christian
religious beliefs, including a belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage."
From its inception and up to the present time the school has maintained racially discrim-
inatory policies.'" In April 1975, the IRS notified Bob Jones University of its intent to
revoke the University's tax-exempt status.'" Revocation of the University's tax-exempt
status followed in January, 1976. 28 This revocation had a retroactive effect. to December I,
1970, when the University first had notice of the change in IRS policy." Bob Jones
University thereafter filed a tax return for the period of December 1, 1970 to December
31, 1975 and paid a total of twenty one dollars in taxes, covering one employee for one
year during this period." The University then filed a claim for a refund from the 1RS.'"
After its claim was denied, the University instituted an action against the IRS in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. 3 "
In this action, the district court granted Bob Jones University the relief it sought,
ordering the IRS to refund the taxes paid by the University and denying the IRS's
counterclaim for back taxes. 33 The district. court based its ruling on three principal
grounds. First, the court found that the 1RS had exceeded the authority delegated to it by
Congress by interpreting section 501(c)(3) to deny tax-exempt status to racially discrim-
Id. at 574.
" Id. at 579-85.
" id.
" See id. at 606-23.
" Id. at 579-80.
" Id. The Supreme Court accepted that the sponsors of Bob Jones University "genuinely believe
that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage." Id. at 580.
26 Id. at 580 - 81. At the time of the Supreme Court's decision, Bob Jones University accepted
blacks but forbade interracial dating or marriage by its students, and denied admission to persons
involved in interracial marriages. Id. Before 1975, Bob Jones University would admit no unmarried
blacks. Id. at 580. Prior to 1971, it denied admission to all black applicants. Id.
'47 Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893 (1978). Prior to this action, in
1971, Bob Jones University was unable to secure assurance of tax-exempt status under the IRS
Revised Rulings and instituted an action in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina to enjoin the IRS from revoking its tax-exempt status. See Bob Jones University v. Simon,
416 U.S. 725, 749-50 (1974). The Supreme Court, however, found that federal courts lacked
authority to block IRS action by injunction. Id. Now, because of the passage of I.R.C. § 7428 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1983), charitable institutions have the right to seek declaratory judgments in the Tax
Court and the Court of Claims. This provision should help mitigate the harm to institutions denied
tax-exempt status that occur due to court delays causing uncertainty about their tax status.
Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893 (1978).
29 Id.
3" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 581-82.
3' Id_
" Id. at 582.
33 See Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (1978).
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inatory private schools:" Second, the court. determined that the denial of the University's
tax-exempt status was improper under IRS rulings and procedures,'" In conclusion, the
court held that the denial of tax-exempt status violated the University's rights to religious
freedom guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. 36
In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's ruling and held that the IRS had acted within its statutory authority in
denying tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University. 37 The Court of Appeals also rejected
the University's first amendment claims" and remanded the case to the district court for
proceedings on the IRS's counterclaim." Following remand of Bob Jones to the district
court, Bob Jones University petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, The Court granted this writ on October 13, 1981. 4 °
The case of Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States was decided with Bob Jones
by the Supreme Court.'" Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation located
in North Carolina offering classes from kindergarten through the high school level:12
Like Bob Jones University, Goldsboro Christian Schools is dedicated to promoting fun-
damentalist Christian beliefs through its educational programs.° The particular interpre-
tation of the Bible espoused by the Goldsboro Christian Schools regards cultural or
biological mixing of the races to be a violation of God's commands." Since its formation in
1963, the school has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy:"
Goldsboro Christian Schools had not received advance assurance from the IRS that it
qualified as a tax-exempt organization under section 50 I(c)(3)." Upon audit of the
schools records for the years 1969 through 1972 the IRS determined that, because of its
discriminatory policies, the school did riot. qualify for tax-exempt. status.'" Goldsboro
Christian Schools then paid $3,459.93 in taxes, covering one employee for the period,
and filed suit against the IRS in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina,' In this action the school sought a refund of the taxes paid, claiming it.
was improperly denied tax-exempt status."
34 See id. at 906. Racially nondiscriminatory policies as to students, according to Rev. Rul.
71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, means that:
(t)he school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and
activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school and that the
school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its educational
policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other
school-administered programs.
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. '230.
35 See Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Stipp. 890, 907 ( 1978 ).
3"
 See id.
" Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 1 7 .2r1 147, 155 (1980).
:" Id. at 153-55.
39 See id. at 155.
" 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
41 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 574.
42 Id. at 583.
43 Id.
" Id. at 583 n.6.
43 Id. at 583. Goldsboro accepts primarily Caucasians, but has occasionally accepted children
from racially -mixed marriages. Id.
" Id.
" See id.
48 Id. at 584.
49 Id.
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The district court found that Goldsboro Christian Schools was not entitled to tax-
exempt status and entered judgment for the IRS on its counterclaim for back taxes.'" In
reaching this holding, t he district court considered the purpose of section 501(c)(3), which
the court determined was to benefit charities returning benefits to society.' Under such a
standard, the court reasoned, giving tax benefits to organizations violating the declared
federal policy against racial discrimination would be improper. 52 The district court also
rejected the contention of Goldsboro Christian Schools that the IRS's denial of tax-
exempt status violated first amendment rights. 53
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. affirmed the district
court's ruling denying tax-exempt status to Goldsboro Christian Schools.'' The court.
stated that its opinion was based on the reasoning set forth in Bob Jones which had already
been decided by another panel of that circuit. 55 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted Goldsboro Christian Schools' petition for a writ of certiorari on October 13,
1981. 5°
In these cases, collectively referred to in this casenote as Bob Jones, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University and
the Goldsboro Christian Schools." The Court. held that the IRS did not exceed the scope
of its delegated authority by interpreting the Code to include a requirement that. educa-
tional institutions be nondiscriminatory to receive tax-exempt status." The Court further
held that Congress had acquiesced in and impliedly ratified the IRS's actions. 5° Finally,
the Court held that the denial of tax-exempt status to the petitioners did not violate their
right to free exercise of religion protected by the first amendment.'"
While the Court's opinion in Bob Jones may further the desirable social objective of
eliminating racial discrimination in education, it does so by glossing over the delegation
issues raised by the case. The Court upheld the IRS's actions in Bob Jones not by finding
that Congress made a legitimate delegation to that agency, but by failing to address the
delegation issues presented. The Court's broad interpretation of section 501(c)(3) grants
the IRS the power to balance and limit important interests and ultimately determine the
contours of public policy. Both Justice Rehnquist in his dissent and Justice Powell in his
concurrence recognized the delegation issues presented by Bob Jones. Each of these
Justices would limit the transfer of Congress' policymaking function to the IRS based on
these concerns. This casenote submits that the Court should have limited the IRS's power
under section 501(c)(3) to prevent it. from determining fundamental public policy. The
process of democratic decisionmaking itself' is important, and the Court. must be willing to
apply the delegation doctrine to limit the transfer of congressional power to administra-
" Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314, 1322 (1977).
Id. at 1318.
St id.
" Id. at 1319-20. The district court additionally examined the question whether Goldsboro's
provision of housing to its teachers constituted remuneration upon which Goldsboro was required to
withhold and pay employment taxes. Id. at 1320. The court determined that such housing did
constitute remuneration. Id. at 1320-22. This question was not reviewed by the Supreme Court. Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. at 584 n.7.
" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 584.
Id. (citing Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (1981) (per curiam)).
M 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 605.
Id. at 599.
" Id.
6, Id, at 604.
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the agencies and assure that Congress maintains its proper role as the author of funda-
mental public policies in the United States.
To set the stage for an analysis of Bob Jones, this casenote first will examine the
theoretical foundations and judicial treatment of delegations of congressional authority to
administrative agencies. This casenote then will provide a brief history of the Code
provisions upon which the revocation of Bob Jones' tax-exempt status was based. Next,
this casenote will outline the opinions of the Court and the concurring and dissenting
Justices in Bo/Jones. A discussion of the opinions will follow. This discussion will show that
t he Court's mode of analysis in Bob Jones — basically one of broad statutory construction
— substitutes an inquiry into the ends reached by administrative decisionmaking for an
application of the principles of the delegation doctrine. The breadth of the IRS's discre-
tion to determine public policy with regard to tax exemptions will be discussed. In
addition, this analysis will demonstrate that Justice Rehnquist's narrow construction of
section 501(c)(3) implicitly addresses the delegation issues raised in Bob Jones, and that
Justice Powell expressly recognizes the role the delegation doctrine should play in guard-
ing against congressional abdication of its policymaking function. Next, this casenote will
discuss the ratification issue presented in Bob Jones and explore its relationship to the
delegation question. This analysis will explain how Justice Powell reconciles his finding of
congressional ratification with his delegation concerns. Finally, this casenote will examine
Justice Rehnquist's view of congressional ratification and discuss why this view causes him
to express delegation concerns in his argument against ratification.
I. THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE
A. Theoretical Foundations of the Delegation. Doctrine
The precise source of the delegation doctrine is unclear."' Article I of the United
States Constitution provides that all legislative power of the federal government shall be
vested in the Congress." Nothing in the Constitution, however, directly prohibits the
delegation of congressional authority to the executive branch.° Nonetheless, courts have
6 ' Legal scholars have sought the origin of the delegation doctrine in the constitutional princi-
ples of separation of powers,see, e.g., R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 427
(1941), and due process, see, e.g., Cushman, The Constitutional Status of The Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 24 Coxr4e1.1.1...Q. 13, 32-33 (1938), in the common law maxim delegate protests not protest
delegari ("A power that is originally delegated may not he redelegated"), see,e.g., Duff and Whiteside,
Delegate Protests Non Protest Delegati: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 168
(1928), in the principles of representative government, see, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL or
ADMINISTRATION ACTION 85 (1965), and in the concept of constitutional supremacy itself, see, e.g.,
Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 311 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Freedman].
" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States ..."
The necessary and proper clause of article I is most frequently used as support for the
constitutionality of delegations. Freedman, supra note 61, at 309 & n.15 (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
The reason for a lack of any such prohibition arguably stems from the framers' belief that the
legislative branch was not the branch most likely to absorb the powers of the other branches of the
government. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); THE
FEDERALIST No. 73, at 441 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The fear of such usurpations was not
unfounded given the tyrannical tendencies of some state legislatures during the confederation
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long recognized that certain delegations of legislative authority are impermissible because
of their inconsistency with the constitutional plan. 64
To understand the rationale for prohibiting delegations of legislative authority to
administrative agencies, the effect of such delegations must be examined in light of the
philosophical bases underpinning the structure of the federal government. 65 A basic tenet-
of this nation's republican form of government is that policy decisions are made by a
representative body accountable to the people." Placing this decisionmaking function in
such a body assures that matters of public policy are grounded in consent." Within this
system of government Congress is designed to be the institution through which consent is
obtained by compromise between the competing interests of our pluralistic society." The
rather unwieldy structure of Congress is uniquely suited to the tedious job of obtaining
consent through compromise, 69 and absent such consent, leaving the rights and obliga-
tions of the people unchanged." The structure of Congress also affords both majority
and minority interests some measure of protection because a smaller, less diverse and
nonrepresentative body is more likely to be seized by a special interest."
Related to this ideal of representative democracy is the principle of constitutional
supremacy" which emphasizes the importance of the structure of the nation's constitu-
tional system of government." The basic premise of constitutional supremacy is that the
Constitution is not just one means to an end but a binding arrangement of offices and
powers.'" An expectation inherent in such an arrangement is that the structure set forth
in the Constitution will not be materially altered." This expectation recognizes that a
change in form, such as a shift in powers from one branch to another is, in effect, a
period. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310-13 j. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Considering the
framers' chief fear was one of legislative usurpation, that they did not view legislative divestments of
control as worrisome and include measures to limit such divestments is not surprising.See Freedman,
supra note 61, at 309.
A motion by James Madison at the Constitutional Convention that the President expressly be
provided the power "to execute such other powers ... as may from time to time be delegated by the
national legislature" was defeated as unnecessary. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL. CONVENTION OF
1787 67 (M. Ferrand ed. 1911).
s' See infra notes 101-149 and accompanying text.
" Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 586 n.35 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Wright].
" See Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Onus& L. REV. 359, 592 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Jaffe]. See also Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). (Noting that "hard choices" must be made by elected
representatives.) Basic policy can not be separated from administration by a well defined line. Jaffe,
supra, at 364. Rather, the articulation of a given policy requires the decision of sub-policies, present-
ing the possibility of infinite recession to lesser and lesser policies. Id. at 369. While requiring
congressional decisionmaking on all levels of policy is not possible some minimum level of con-
gressional action and agreement must exist for Congress to fulfill its role. Id. at 359.
" Jaffe, supra note 66, at 359.
" See id. at 592.
69 See id. at 369.
70
 See id.
" See Jaffe, supra note 66, at 359.
72 See Freedman, supra note 61, at 311-15.
73 Id. at 312.
' Id.
75 See id. at 315.
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change in content.'" Such a rearrangement. alters the relationship between the branches
of government and assigns powers to branches not designed to exercise them. 77
In juxtaposition to these fundamental tenets regarding this nation's form of govern-
ment is the practical necessity of delegating congressional authority to the executive
branch." Today, vast legislative authority is exercised by administrative agencies in their
rulemaking powers. Congress does not have the resources to occupy itself with the
day-to-day operation of the laws," nor can Congress include in legislation rules to meet
every possible contingency" or anticipate all of the circumstances potentially affecting the
implementation of legislation. 8 ' The necessity of delegating congressional authority to
administrative agencies is apparent. 8' Equally apparent, however, is the necessity of
placing some limit on these delegations to preserve the system of government envisioned
by the Founders and embodied in the Constitution. 83 Therefore, a standard must be
developed to test the validity of delegations of congressional authority to administrative
agencies.
A useful principle upon which to focus in determining the proper limits of con-
gressional delegations is the "institutional competence" discussed by Professor James 0.
Freedman." According to this principle, the framers invested certain powers in Congress
because of its unique institutional characteristics, and therefore, it is essential that Con-
gress retain those characteristics. 85
 For example, Congress may not transfer to others the
task of deciding between salient policy alternatives because it is uniquely suited to make
such decisions. 86
 Thus, institutional competence unites the concern that public policy
decisions be grounded in consent and the concern that the constitutional structure not be
altered by allowing a rearrangement of powers within the government. 87
This congressional responsibility for policy formation does not mean that Congress
may not delegate decisions to other branches. Its delegations, however, must be instru-
ments of decision rather than substitutes for decision." Congress makes a delegation an
instrument of decision by providing standards to guide administrative action accurately
reflecting its choice among the policy alternatives considered." Withh Congress making the
decision between salient alternatives, the role of the administrative agency is to function





" The necessity of delegating decisions to administrative agencies has become more pro-
nounced as our society has become more industrialized. See Jaffe, supra note 66, at 359, 565-68.
Professor Jaffe has referred to delegation of lawmaking power as "[t]he Dynamo of modern
government. - Id. at 359.
7.9
 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 597.
80
 Jaffe, supra note 66, at 363.
8 ' See Bab Janes, 461 U.S. at 597.
82 Jaffe, supra note 66, at 359.
" See Freedman, supra note 61, at 311 - 12.
84 See id. at 318.
85 See id. at 315, 317-18.
eh Id.
" Id. at 315 - 18.
"
89 Id. at 316.
90 Wright, supra note 65, at 583. The problem of an agency exceeding the authority legitimately
delegated to it should be distinguished from the problem of Congress delegating authority which
may not be legitimately delegated. The first involves an administrative act unauthorized by Congress,
the second, an unauthorized act by Congress itself.
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An agency's role becomes unclear, however, when Congress fails to express a clear
policy choice between salient alternatives. 9 ' In passing statutes delegating authority to
administrative agencies, Congress may be unable to decide between alternative courses of
action," because of political pressure or simple fragmentation within Congress." In such
cases Congress may pass a broad delegation of authority to an administrative agency, in
effect. asking the agency to make the choices and get the job done." Such delegations are
substitutes for, rather than instruments of decision." By making broad delegations,
Congress abdicates its legislative responsibility. 96 This abdication of the policymaking
function results in choices being made by an administrative agency for which Congress
was unable to, or chose not to, obtain consent through the majoritarian political process. 97
The courts, by mandating that Congress retain functions for which it has unique
institutional competence, may help prevent such abdications. 99 Because institutional com-
petence concentrates on the nature of the power being transferred and the degree to
which the delegation reflects a congressional policy choice among salient alternatives, it
may be used by the courts to define proper limits for congressional delegations to
administrative agencies. 99 Institutional competence does not provide a formula separating
legitimate delegations from illegitimate delegations with mathematical precision. Rather,
it provides a focus for analysis through which courts may help to insure that Congress
maintains its role as the author of fundamental public policy." 91 Courts have recognized
the validity of many such theoretical concerns underlying the delegation doctrine. As the
following section of this casenote will demonstrate, however, the Supreme Court has
given only limited application to these principles.
B. The Court's Approach to Congressional Delegations
The Court has long recognized that overbroad delegations of congressional authority
to the executive branch are impermissible under the Constitution.'"' While espousing the
validity of this doctrine proscribing delegations of congressional authority, the Court has
91 See id. at 585.
9 .1
93 See Jaffe, supra note 66, at 367.
94 Wright, supra note 65, at 585.
95 See id.; see also, American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 547 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
" Freedman, supra note 61, at 315.
97 Wright, supra note 65, at 586 & n.35.
" Freedman, supra note 61, at 336. For an alternative approach to the delegation problem, see
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HA RV. L. Rev. 1669 (1975). Professor
Stewart suggests an interest group representation model as a possible solution to the problem of
policy formation taking place in administrative agencies. Id. at 1790-1802. This proposal theoretically
solves the problem or agency's institutional incompetence by altering its structure and subjecting it to
more direct democratic control. Id. at 1711-13. Professor Stewart, however, concludes that such an
interest representation system is an inadequate solution for the problem of administrative discretion.
Id. at 1803-05, While Professor Stewart does not advocate a reinvigoration of the delegation doctrine,
he does recognize that it might play a "modest" role in policing delegations. Id. at 1693-97.
99 See Freedman, supra note 61, at 317-18, 336.
mu Id.
1" In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892), the Court declared: "That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
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almost universally upheld such delegations. 102 Throughout the early years of this century,
as the administrative apparatus of the country grew, the Court searched for a standard by
which to judge the increasingly broad and frequent delegations it was called upon to
examine. 7 o3 After experimenting with several tests, the Court, in Hampton and Co. v. United
States,'" developed a standard which maintains at least theoretical acceptance today.'° 5
This standard, set forth by Chief Justice Taft, provides that so long as Congress lays down
an "intelligible principle" to guide agency action its delegation of legislative power is
permissible)" The "intelligible principle" theoretically provides the agency with a clear
standard upon which to base its policies.'" More important, the "intelligible principle"
laid down by Congress provides the courts with a standard by which to judge agency
actions and limit agency discretion.'" The existence of a standard also implies a choice
between alternative standards and hence reflects a congressional policy decision.'" By
requiring an "intelligible principle" which reflects the Congress' policy choice, therefore,
the Court may prevent. Congress from abdicating its role as the author of fundamental
public policy.'"
While purportedly adhering to the "intelligible principle" test, the Court has upheld
exceedingly broad delegations of congressional authority.'" Only twice has the Court
used this test to strike down legislative delegations of authority. 112 The Court's validation
`" Freedman, .supra note 61, at 307 & n.3.
" For a discussion of the early tests proposed to limit delegations, see GELLHORN, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 53-55 (7th ed. 1979).
X 04 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding a tariff provision granting the President authority to revise
tariffs to compensate for the differences in cost of production between United States manufacturers
and manufacturers in exporting countries).
I" See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Re-
hnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Hampton and confirming its theoretical validity); National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).
'" Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
117 Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
'" See Freedman, supra note 61, at 315.
10
 Industrial Union Dept, v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
See Freedman, supra note 61, at 307-08; see also American Textile Mfrs. lust, v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490 (1981) (upholding delegation of authority to Secretary of Labor to prevent exposure of
workers to cotton dust to the extent "feasible"); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (uphold-
ing delegation to Secretary of Interior to choose among water users and settle the terms of contracts
when apportioning impounded waters); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding
delegation to Price Administrator to promulgate regulations fixing prices which "in his view will be
generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of the Act"); FCC v. Pot sville Broadcast-
ing Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940) (upholding "public convenience, interest or necessity" as adequate
standard).
I" See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Panama Refining brought into question Title 1 of the National Indust rial
Recovery Act of 1933. 293 U.S. at 406. Section 9(c) of that Act authorized the President to prohibit
the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum products pro-
duced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount allowed to be produced or withdrawn by
state law. Id. Section 9 made a violation of such presidential order punishable by fine or imprison-
ment. Id. The Supreme Court held that section 9 unlawfully delegated legislative power to the
President and was therefore invalid. Id. at 433. Despite a lengthy, if somewhat broad, "Declaration of
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of such broad delegations of authority has led commentators to question whether the
Court retains any commitment to the theoretical foundations of the "intelligible princi-
ple" test, " 3 No federal judge, however, has expressly disavowed the delegation doctrine in
its entirety." a Moreover, several decisions exist. which reassert the doctrine as at least a
theoretical check on Congress' actions.'
The Court has sometimes avoided the necessity of determining whether a delegation
is invalid by using principles of statutory construction to narrow the broad language of
the delegation. 15 This technique avoids the wholesale invalidation of statutes which might
result from a strict application of the delegation doctrine."'Kent v. Dulles" 8 and National
Cable Television Ass'n. v. United States"' are two important cases in which the Court. used
this approach.
Policy- in section 1 of the Act, id. at 416 n.6, the Court found that the Act provided the President "an
unlimited authority to determine the policy and lay clown the prohibition." Id. at 415. The Court
found Congress' "Declaration of Policy" lacking because the President was not required to choose
among the Act's broadly stated and diverse objectives but could act at his discretion with no standard
to guide his actions. Id. at 418. The Court stated: "Congress has declared no policy, has established
no standard, has laid clown no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and
conditions in which the transportation is to he allowed or prohibited." Id. at 430.
Justice Cardozo, dissenting, would have upheld the delegation because he found: (I) that the
nature of the act to he performed by the President was definite, and limited his control to specified
products produced or withdrawn in excess of state authority, id. at 434, 490, and (2) that the
congressional declaration of policy in section 1 provided a sufficient standard to make the statute
valid. Id. at 435, 439-40.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 995 (1935), brought into question the "Live
Poultry Code" promulgated by the executive branch under section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933. Id. at 521. That section granted the President the authority to prescribe a code
of fair competition for any trade or industry and made a violation of that code a misdemeanor. Id. at
521 n.4. The Court held the codemaking authority to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the President. Id. at 542. The majority distinguished Schecter from precedent upholding
delegations of power to prevent "unfair methods of competition" and allowing acquisitions by
interstate carriers "in the public interest" by pointing out that those acts created quasi-judicial bodies
and provided administrative procedures for review of decisions. Id. at 531-33. Unlike those acts, the
majority concluded: "the National Industrial Recovery Act dispenses with this administrative proce-
dure and with soy administrative procedure or analogous character." Id. at 533.
Justice Cardozo, concurring with the majority, found that, unlike the delegation brought into
question in Panama Refining, the delegation in Scheeler was not limited to a specific act or class of acts.
Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring). Further, he determined that the concept of "fair competition" is
shown by the terms or this section and the administrative practices thereunder was not limited to
restraint of unfair competition, but included "whatever ordinances may be desirable or helpful for
the well being or prosperity of the industry affected." Id. at 552-53 (Cardozo, J., concurring). As
such, Justice Cardozo believed this delegation allowed the President to do "anything that Congress
may do within the limits of the commerce clause for the betterment of business." Id. at 553 (Cardozo,
J., concurring). He concluded that "Injo such plentitude of power is susceptible of transfer." Id.
"3 See Freedman, supra note 61, at 307-10.
"14 Wright, supra note 65, at 582.
"s Id. at 582-83; see, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing basis of the delegation doctrine); National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (discussed infra text accompanying notes
130-48); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 118-29).
"" Stewart, supra note 98, at 1681.
117 Id.
" 8 357 U.S. 136 (1958).
' 19 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
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In Kent the Court examined regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Slate which
precluded the issuance of passports to citizens who were, or had recently been, members
of the Communist. party.' 2" The 1926 statute under which the Secretary operated in t his
case provided only that he might. grant and issue passports under rules the President.
might prescribe."' Kent came before the Court when t.wo citizens who had been denied
passports brought actions to overturn the Secretary's denial of their applications.'"
In overturning the Secretary's denial of these applications, the Court noted that the
right to travel, infringed by the regulations in question is an important part of a citizen's
"liberty" protected by the fifth amendment.'" The Court construed the statute as allow-
ing denial of applications only on the grounds of citizenship or illegal activities.'" By
narrowly construing the stature, the Court avoided having to address the question
whether denying passport applications on the basis of involvement with the Communist
party was an impermissible infringement of citizens' liberty.'" Because constitutionally
protected freedoms were involved and a broad reading of the statutes involved would
give the Secretary unbridled discretion to grant or withhold those freedoms, the Court
implied a standard and invalidated the regulations issued by the Secretary.'" If liberty is
to he regulated, the Court stated, the regulation must he pursuant to the lawmaking
function of Congress." 7
 The Court went on to state that if the power to regulate liberty
were delegated, adequate standards must be provided to guide administrative action.' 2 '
Absent such an explicit delegation, and despite the broad language of the statute in-
volved, the Court in Kent refused to find that the agency had been delegated the power to
restrict these protected freedoms. 129
In National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, ""as in Kent, the Court used it narrow
statutory construct ion 10 create a standard to guide administrative action.' 31 National Cable
Television Ass'n brought. into question a statute authorizing administrative agencies to
charge fees to cover the costs of koviding services to persons and corporations."' Under
the statute, the lees were to be based on the "value to t he recipient," the "public policy or
interest. served, and other pertinent facts."" Ike corporate petitioner in National Cable
'a' Kent, 357 U.S. at 117 n.l.
'" Id. at 123.
' 22
 Id. at 117-19.
1 " Id. at 125.
' 14 Id. at 128.
12"See id, at 127. This interpretation, the Court noted, was consistent with how the statute in
question and its predecessor had been applied in the past, Id.
' 26 Id. at 128.




13" 415 U.S. 336 1974).
1 '11
 Id. at 337.
' 3I Id. at 340.
133 Id. at 34I. The Court cited the-relevant portion of 31 § 143a, which states:
It is the sense of the Congress thin any work, service ... benefit „ license ... or similar
thing of value or utility performed, furnished, provided granted
	 , by any Federal
Agency ... to or fo r any person (including ... corporations
	 ) ... shall he self-
sustaining to the full extent possible, and the head of each Federal Agency is authorized
by regulation to prescribe therefor ... such lee, charge, or price, if any, as he shall
determine ... to be fair and equitable taking into consideration direct and indirect cost
to the Government, value to the recipient, public policy or interest served, and other
pertinent facts ....
415 U.S. at 341.
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Television AS5'12 challenged the assessment of a fee by the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) to cover direct and indirect costs of regulating the corporation."'
Allowing assessment of fees based on "public policy or interest served," the Court
concluded, would put agencies in search of revenue much like an appropriations commit-
tee of the House of Representatives.' 35 Such a search for revenue was t he basis for the
FCC's fee in this case, the Court. determined, because the petitioner was paying not only
for benefits received from the FCC but also for services provided to the general public.'"
The Court pointed out that. such an assessment. was a tax which could only be levied by
Congress.'" Because bestowing the power to levy taxes on a federal agency would
constitute such sharp break from tradition, the Court read the statute narrowly, using t he
phrase "value to the recipient" as the measure of the allowable fee, and disregarding the
phrase "public policy and interest served." 130 Thus, because of Congress' unique compe-
tence in the taxing area, the Court refused to give effect to the express terms of this
authorizing statute and invalidated the FCC's fee.
Alt hough neither Kent nor National Cable Television Ass'n explicitly invoked the dele- .
gation doctrine, both cases emphasize the roles institutional competence and standards
play in limiting overbroad delegations.'" By implying a standard to save an overbroad
delegation, the Court in Kent reaffirmed that Congress may delegate legislative power
only under certain conditions.' 49 Moreover, by restricting the authority of the Secret ary of
State to stay within Congress' intent, the Court. gave Congress the opportunity to review
the broader implications of its decision and enact an explicit delegation if it desired to do
so.'" In Kent, therefore, the Court prevented Congress from abdicating its policymaking
function." In National Cable Television Ass'n, the Court showed a similar concert) for
standards but focused on a different aspect of delegation analysis. "3 The Court indicated
that Congress' freedom to delegate the exercise of a power to another branch is
influenced by the particular significance of the power it attempts to delegate. 144 Because
of the importance of the taxing power"' and Congress' unique ability to exercise such a
power, the Court did not find a delegation of the taxing power was intended, even though
the statute easily could be read as transferring that power to an administrative agency. 146
The Court. may have been suggesting that, in certain instances, considerations of institu-




13" Id. at 342-43.
I" See Freedman, supra note 61, at 318-29, for an in-depth discussion of the relationships of
these cases to the concept of institutional competence.
1 " Kent, 357 U.S. at 128.
141 Id. at 122-24.
142 Id.
j43 The Court in National Cable Television Ass'n stated: "Whether the present Act meets the
requirement of Schecter and Hampton is a question we do not reach, but the hurdles revealed in those
decisions lead us to read the act narrowly to avoid constitutional problems." 415 U.S. at 342.
74 Id, at 340.
"5
 The importance of the taxing power and the necessity of that power not being too far
removed from the people, has long been recognized by the Court. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819) ("The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the
structure of the government itself.").
1 " National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 341.
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tional competence may prevent Congress from delegating a power. ' 4 ' While the Court did
not expressly recognize this position, its holding does show the Court's awareness that.
Congress' institutional competence to exercise certain powers will play a role in determin-
ing how explicit a delegation must be.' 48
The analysis employed by the Court in Kent and National Cable Television Ass'n will be
used later in this casenote to aid in the critique of the Court's approach to the delegation
issue present ed in Bob Jones. To maintain an accurate perspective of the present state of
the law, however, the reader should remember that decisions limiting or striking down
delegations are far outnumbered by those upholding exceedingly broad delegations of
authority. 149 Before outlining the Court's reasoning in Bob Jones and critiquing that
opinion, this casenote will explore the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code contain-
ing the challenged delegation and discuss the decade of litigation leading up to the
Court's decision in Bob Jones.
11. THE HISTORY OF TAX EXEMPTION FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1913, passed after the adoption of the sixteenth
amendment, every income tax act has included an exemption for private educational
instil utions, is" Presently, under section 501(0(3) of t he internal Revenue Code, Congress
grants tax-exempt status to various types of organizations's' including nonprofit educa-
tional institutions. Through section 170 of the Code, Congress also allows gifts to these
organizations to he tax deductible.'" Until 1970, these tax advantages were accorded to
private schools throughout the country regardless of whether the schools discriminated
on the basis of race.'" In 1970, however, in the case of" Green v. Kennedy,'" the United
States District Court fo'r the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction restrain-
ing the 1 RS from providing rulings assuring tax-exempt status to a number of Mississippi
private schools maintaining discriminatory admissions policies.' 55
Kennedy involved a class action suit by black taxpayers and their minor school children
who attended public schools in Mississippi. The suit challenged the constitutionality of the
IRS's grant of tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools.'" Plaintiffs claimed
that. the grant of such status served to establish and maintain segregated schools in
violation of the Constitution. 157 They further claimed that the segregated schools did not
meet. the statutory requirements of section 170(a) or section 501(c)(3), '58 and that provid-
ing deductions and exemptions violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 59
The three judge district court sitting in Kennedy issued a preliminary injunction
restraining the IRS from issuing letter rulings on tax-exempt status to discriminatory
HT See Freedman, supra note 61, at 336.
I" See id.
1 " See supra note 111.
1 " See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 589 n.14.
' 37 See supra note 4 for text of section 501(c)(3).
133 See supra note 5 for text of section 170.
1S3 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 577-78.
1" 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), app. dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
' 35 Id. at 1132.
"" Id. at 1129.
"7 Id.
," Id. at 1130.
"3 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which prohibits racial discrimination "under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance").
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private schools in Mississippi.'"" The preliminary injunction issued by the court in Kennedy
did not require the wit hdrawal of rulings regarding deductibility under section 170(a) or
exemption under section 501(c)(3) that were then in effect.'" Nor did the injunction
provide that such status would not be accorded to discriminatory schools and contribu-
tions to those schools in the future.'" The injunction simply prevented the advance
assurance of deductibility and exemption by enjoining the IRS from issuing letter rulings
on requests for such status.'"
Although not required to do so by the preliminary injunction issued in Kennedy, the
IRS revised its national policy so that. schools discriminating on the basis of race would be
prevented from obtaining tax-exempt. status under section 501(c)(3). 1"4 Concurrently, the
IRS announced that gifts to such institutions could not be deducted as charitable con-
tributions under section 170.' 85 The IRS notified private schools of this change in pol-
icy. 166
In Green a. Connally,"'' the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
made permanent the preliminary injunction issued in Kertnedy.`"8 In Connally, in an
opinion written by Judge Leventhal, the court extensively explored the common law of
charitable trusts, specifically the idea that charitable trusts must provide a public be-
nefit. " The court noted that if it were to follow the approach of interpreting the relevant.
code provisions informed by the common law of charitable trusts, a strong case could be
made for upholding the 1970 IRS interpretation of the code denying racially discrimina-
tory schools tax-exempt status."" The Connally court, however, founded its decision on
federal policy."' In a number of decisions concerning ordinary and necessary business
expense deductions under section 162 of the Code, the court found the basis for a federal
policy against allowing tax benefits which promoted violations of the law.'" These cases
disallowed deductions which would have encouraged violation of declared public poll-
cies. 173 Given the government's strong public policy against racial discrimination, the
court. in Connally concluded that the Code could not he interpreted to provide tax benefits
to the racially discriminatory private schools in question.'"
The permanent injunction issued by the court in Connally prohibited the IRS from




"S 4 See supra note 8.
' 65 Id.
166 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 578.
' 6' 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
' 68 Id. at 1155. This permanent injunction expanded the scope of the preliminary injunction to
include all Mississippi schools, not just those organized as an alternative for white students seeking to
avoid desegregated public schools. Id. at 1155, 1179.
165
	 at 1158.
110 Id. at 1161.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1161-62.
113 Id. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) (disallowing deduction for amounts
paid to employees and for a lease of a building by defendants conducting gambling operations illegal
under stale law); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958) (disallowing
deduction of fines imposed on truck owners for violation of state maximum weight laws),
'" Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1164.
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granting any application for tax-exempt status for any Mississippi private schools unless
the school made a showing t hat it had both adopted, and given "meaningful notice" of, a
nondiscriminatory policy regarding students.'' The injunction specified procedures for
implementing these requirements and further required that the schools provide relevant
statistical data to the IRS to show their efforts to abide by these rules.'" Finally, the
injunction prohibited the IRS from continuing in effect any previous ruling of tax-
exempt status or from approving the deductibility under section 170 of contributions to
Mississippi private schools unless the nondiscrimination requirements were met. 177
Although the court's order in Connally was limited to Mississippi private schools, the
IRS heeded the court's suggestion that such requirements would he proper for all schools
of the nation and formalised its policies adopted after Kennedy by issuing Revenue Ruling
71-447. 17H This ruling both prohibited the granting of tax-exempt status to private schools
maintaining discriminatory policies and required schools seeking tax-exempt. status to
publicize their nondiscriminatory policies. 1 9 In 1975, prior to the initiation of Bob Jones,
1 he IRS issued a revenue procedure, updating its requirements for schools seeking
tax-exempt status.'" This revenue procedure provided guidelines and mandated that
schools keep certain records to aid the IRS in determining whether schools policies were
nondiscriminatory.'"' The procedure required an affirmative showing by each school that
racially nondiscriminatory policies had been adopted and made public and that the school
had operated in compliance with those policies."' The IRS also promulgated a revenue
ruling specifically denying tax-exempt status to religious schools maintaining racially
discriminatory policies, even if those policies are founded on religious beliefs. 193
 Subse-
quently. in Bob Jones, the Supreme Court upheld the IRS's action under these revised
requirements denying tax-exempt status to two racially discriminatory schools.'" The
next section of this casenote will outline the opinions of the Court and the concurring and
dissenting justices in Bob Jones,
1, THE OPINIONS IN BOB JONES UNIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES
A. The Court's Analysis
111 Bob Jones, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court.
addressed the question whether section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code au-
," Id. at 1179-80.[76 Id.
17 Id. at 1180.
I" Id. at 1176; see also Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834 (requiring t hat private schools publicize
their nondiscriminatory policies and providing publication guidelines).
179 Id,
'"" Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
Id. at 587-90.
182 Id. This procedure allowed religious schools to meet the publication requirement through
notice in a religious magazine or newsletter of the organization. Id. at 588.
'" Rev. Rul, 75-23], 1975-1 Cl',., 	 158, 159. In 1978 the IRS proposed revised guidelines for
granting tax exemption to private schools. See Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt
Schools, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). For a discussion of these proposed guidelines and congressional
reaction to the proposal, sec Devins, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: A
Legislative Proposal. 20 HAM, . J. ON Lents. 153, 158-59 (1983).




thorized the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools.'"' In
examining this issue, the Court first turned its attention to section 501(c)(3). The Court
noted that to be entitled to tax-exempt status under that section an organization must fall
within one of the eight categories enumerated in the section,'" These eight exempt
categories, the Court observed, include "religious, charitable ... or educational" organi-
zations.'"' The Court cautioned, however, that falling within One of these eight categories
will not in itself assure an organization of tax-exempt slants. ' "" To gain lax-exempt status,
the Court added, an organization must not be engaged in an activity that is contrary to
public policy.'"" In reaching this conclusion, the Court found it necessary to go beyond the
literal language of section 50I(c)(3) to prevent defeating the section's plain purpose.'"
The Court examined section 501(c)(3) in the context of the Internal Revenue Code and
against the background of congressional purpose. As part of its investigation into the
purpose of tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) the Court looked to section 170, which
provides deductions for "charitable contributions." 192 Section 170, the Court. noted, pro-
vides a list of "charitable" organizations to which contributions may he made on a
tax-deductible basis."' This list, the court continued, is virtually identical to the eight
categories found in section 50 i(c)(3). 1114 Thus, by examining these two sections in tandem,
the Court. found that. Congress intended to provide tax benefits only to organizations
serving "charitable purposes."'"
To discover the meaning of the word "charitable" in these sections the Court exam-
ined the origins of charitable tax exemptions in the law of charitable trusts.'" In the
legislative history of section 501(c)(3)' 97 the Court found support for the view that the
exemption provisions of that section are based on the law of charitable trusts. Charitable
trusts are accorded a privileged position,'"" the Court noted, because their activities
Id, at 577.
' 86 Id. at 585.
'" Id.
1" Id. at 591-92.
See a
"9° Id. at 586. The Court did riot dispute that section 501(c)(3), if read literally, does not
expressly require that organizations falling within the exempt categories listed must also be "charita-
ble." See id. at 585-86. Rather, the Court found it necessary to go beyond the literal language of the
statute to effectuate Congress' intent to benefit only "charitable" institutions. Id. at 586 - 87.
"' See id. at 585-92. Petitioners noted that the disjunctive "or" separates the eight categories
enumerated in section 501(c)(3). Id. at 585. This separation, they argued, precluded applying the
word "charitable," which is one of the eight categories, to the other seven categories so as to snake it
an additional requirement. for each of them. Id. at 585-86. The reading proposed by the government,
they argued, would provide tax exemptions for charitable religious, charitable educational, charita-
ble scientific, etc. . .. purposes: Petitioners argued that reading the section according to its plain
meaning precluded the addition of such a requirement. Id. Falling within one of the eight enumer-
ated categories and meeting the non - profit and political action requirements of section 501(c), they
argued, entitles an organization to tax-exempt status. Id.
'" Id. at 586-88.
193 Id. at 586.
'" Id. at 586-88.
1 " Id, at 587 & n.11. For a contrasting view, see justice Rehnquist's argument to the effect that.
the categories enumerated in section 501(0(3) have in fact been defined as charitable for the purpose
of tax exemptions and deductions by section I70(c). Id, at 61 3-14 (Rehnquist,,]., dissenting).
' 95 Id. at 588-91.
197 Id. at 588 n.12.
1" See generally C. Roc,EitT, LAW OF i s itUSTS (5th ed. 1973). Under the rypres doctrine courts will
give charitable trusts liberal and favorable construction to support their validity and achieve the
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promote social well-being and have a beneficial effect upon the community. 199
 Under the
common law, the Court continued, if the purposes of an ostensibly charitable gift violate
public policy, courts will not accord that gift the protection given charitable trusts.'" A
gift is, therefore, not "charitable' under the common law if it. violates public policy.'"' The
Court decided that because the exemptions contained in section 501(c)(3) are based on
the "public benefit" principle of the common law of charitable trusts, such tax benefits,
like the benefits accorded to charitable trusts, may nor inure to organizations which are
illegal or violate established public policy."' The Court concluded, therefore, that to gain
the benefits of tax-exempt status accorded by section 501(c)(3), an organization must not
only fall within one of the eight enumerated categories in that section, but must also
"serve and be in harmony with the public interest.." 203
Having established that an organization must provide a public benefit to qualify for
tax exemption under 501(c)(3), the Court next determined that. the IRS could properly
conclude that racially discriminatory private schools were unworthy of these lax be-
nefits." In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined I his nation's public policy
against racial discrimination.' The Court found broad support in acts of Congress,'" in
numerous executive orders"' and in its own past. decisions"' for the proposition that
racial discrimination violates a must fundamental national policy.'" This policy against
racial discrimination, the Court observed, is especially strong concerning discrimination
in education."'" In light of such a strong policy against racial discrimination, the Court
found that private schools with racially discriminatory policies did not. confer a public
benefit. wit hin the charitable concept underlying sect ions 170 and 501(c)(3). 2 " This strong
policy against racial discrimination led the Court to conclude that the IRS denial of
lax-exempt status to racially discriminatory institutions was correct.'
After establishing the existence of a strong national policy against racial discrimina-
tion, the Court addressed petitioners' arguments that the IRS had overstepped its dele-
gated authority in denying petitioners tax-exempt status.'" The primary responsibility
for construing the Code, the Court noted, was delegated to the IRS by Congress.'" This
intended public benefits. Id. at 524. This equitable power allows t he court to remodel extensively
such truisms, even to the extent of applying the trust funds to charitable purposes different than those
named by the [rumor, when (he settler's charitable purpose is impossible or impractical. Id. Charita-
ble trusts arc not subject to the private trust requirement that estates not be "indefinitely' inalienable"
in the hands of individuals, id. at 252, and are thus allowed to be perpetual. See id. Nor is a charitable
must required to name specific beneficiaries since the public is the real beneficiary. Id. at 206-07.
"s Rob Jones, 461 U.S. at 589.
2"1 Id. at 591.
2"' See id.
▪ Id. at 591-92.
2'" Id
. at 592.
'"4 Id. at 592-96.
2115
2" Id. at 594 (citing Otter alia Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.	 88-352, 78
Stat. 24 I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c -6, 2000d; the Voting Rights Act of 1965, rub. 	 89 - 110, 79 Stat.
437, 42 U.S.C. § 1971).
2 07 a at 594-95.
▪ Id. at 593-94.
2" /d. at 595-96.
▪ Id. at 595.
1'' Id. at 595 -96.
212 See id. at 592 -96.
2'' Id. at 596.
2" Id. at 596-97.
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responsibility, the Court added, is subject to review and check by the courts and by
Congress.'" The Court stated, however, that Congress can not involve itself in the
day-to-day applications of the Code.'" The changing conditions and new problems to
which the Code must be applied daily, the Court recognized, necessitate that the IRS have
broad authority to interpret. Code provisions.'" Because the IRS has the responsibility of
implementing the legislative will,''" the Court concluded that in interpreting sections
501(c)(3) and 170 the IRS may properly refer to the law of charitable trusts on which
those sections are based."'
The IRS's delegated responsibility, the Court stated, is first to determine whether an
organization is "charitable" for the purposes of sections 170 and 501(c)(3).'" If the
organization is found by the IRS to he violating public policy and consequently is not
"charitable," the Court concluded, the 1 RS must further determine whet her the activities
in question violate public policy to such an extent that the organization may not be
deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of charitable tax-exempt status."'
In applying this two-step analysis to the facts presented in Bob Jones, the Court
reiterated that. the petitioners were at odds with the declared position of the government
against racial discrimination in education and that they provided no beneficial or stabiliz-
ing influence in the community."' The Court. thus agreed with the IRS's determination
that the petitioners did not provide a public benefit worthy of charitable tax-exempt
status.'" Emphasizing that the national policy regarding racial discrimination is clear and
unequivocal, the Court. held that the IRS did not exceed its authority in interpreting the
Internal Revenue Code to deny petitioners tax-exempt status. 224
After concluding that the IRS did not exceed its delegated authority to interpret the
Code, the Court in Bob Jones addressed the implications of Congress' failure to overturn
IRS's rulings on the issue." 25 The Court recognized that congressional inaction regarding
an administrative ruling is usually given little weight. in determining the correctness of the
215 Id. at 596.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See id. at 596 n.12, 596-98.
219 id, at 597-98. The Court cited the historical practice of the IRS of referring to the law of
charitable trusts to interpret provisions similar to section 501(c)(3). Id.
226 Id.
22I Id. This test seemingly produces the anomalous result that an organization may not be
charitable in a common-law sense yet may he tax-exempt as charitable. See infra note 295. This result
apparently contradicts the Court's earlier statement that "entitlement to tax exemption depends on
meeting certain common law standards of charity — namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt
status must serve a public purpose and not he contrary to established public policy." Id. at 597
(emphasis added). Restricting denial of tax-exempt status to instructions which so violate public
policy that they provide no net public benefit also qualified the Court's broad language that
organizations must "demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest" to be tax-
exempt. Id. at 598.
2" Id. at 598-99.
225
 See id.
12° Id. The Court, by a broad reading of section 501(c)(3), avoided having to address whet her the
tax benefits provided by sections 501(c)(3) and 170 constitute sufficient state action to mandate
denying the benefits to discriminatory organizations under fifth amendment due process require-
ments. A narrow statutory construction of section 501(c)(3), such as the construction adopted by
justice Rehnquist, in contrast, would solve the delegation question but bring into question the fifth
amendment state action requirement.
225 Id. at 599.
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ruling.""e The Court, however, considered Congress' failure to enact legislation modifying
the IRS's rulings considered in Bob Jones to present an especially strong case of legislative
acquiescence and ratification by implication of the I RS's rulings."' The Court specifically
noted that Congress had held exhaustive hearings on the IRS's actions 2" and that thirteen
bills had been introduced to overturn the I RS's rulings." 9 Not only had Congress failed to
overturn the rulings, the Court found, but it had affirmatively manifested its acquiescence
to the rulings when it enacted section 501(i) of the Code.'" Section 501(i), the Court
noted, had the effect of overturning a District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision"'
according tax-exempt status to discriminatory private social clubs under section
501(c)(7)." 2
 Within the legislative history of section 501(i), the Court found committee
reports focusing on the decision in Green v. Connally. 233 The Court found these reports to
be particularly persuasive evidence that Congress was in agreement with the IRS's conclu-
sion that discrimination is impermissible in tax exempt educational institutions."' Conse-
quently, the Court concluded that Congress had impliectly ratified the IRS's rulings.
After deciding the ratification issue, the Court in Bob Jones concluded by examining
whether t he IRS construction of sections 170 and 501(c)(3) violated petitioners' right to
2" Id, at 600.
" 7
 Id. at 599.
22" Id. at 600.
"" Id. at 600-0!.
23° Id. at 601. Section 501(i) provides as follows:
(i) Prohibition of discrimination by certain social clubs.
Notwithstanding subsection (a), an organization which is described in subsection (c)(7)
shall not be exempt from taxation under subsection (a) for any taxable year if, at any
time during such taxable year, the charter, bylaws, or other governing instrument, of
such organization or any written policy statement of such organization contains a
provision which provides for discrimination against any person on the basis of race,
color, or religion. The preceding sentence to the extent it relates to discrimination on
the basis of religion shall not apply to —
(I) an auxiliary of a fraternal beneficiary society if such society —
(A) is described in subsection (c)(8) and exempt from tax under subsection (a),
and
(l3) limits its membership to the members of a particular religion, or,
(2) a club which in good faith limits its membership to the members of a particular
religion in order to further the teachings or principles of Mat religion, and not to
exclude individuals of a particular race or color.
I.R.C. § 501(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983).
"' McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
232
 BobJones, 461 U.S. at 60! & n.21. In McGlotten a black taxpayer brought a class action suit to
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from granting tax-exempt status to fraternal and nonprofit
organizations excluding blacks. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.D.C. 1972). The
court found that the tax exemption accorded by section 501(c)(8) provided sufficient government
benefit to fraternal orders to constitute state action and preclude conferring tax-exempt status on
discriminatory fraternal organizations. Id, at 459. The court also found that organizations receiving
benefits under section 170(c) had received sufficient support from the government to require them
to be nondiscriminatory or lose the benefit of tax-deductible contributions. See id. at 456-57. The
court, however, held that the tax exemption provided to nonprofit clubs by section 501(c)(7) did riot
operate as a grant of federal funds. Id. at 458. The court, therefore, found insufficient state action to
require these clubs to be nondiscriminatory or lose their tax-exempt status. !d. at 458.
233
 Bob Janes, 461 U.S. at 601-02; see supra notes 167 - 177 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Green v. Connally.
2" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 601-02; see also id. at 607 ri,2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first. amendment." 5 The Court did not deny
that the revocation of petitioners' tax-exempt status would burden the exercise of their
religion,"" but emphasized that not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional." 37 The
Court stated that religious liberty may be limited when a limitation is essential to accom-
plish an overriding government interest."' In the present case, the Court concluded that
while the denial of tax benefits would have a substantial effect on the operation of private
religious schools, denial of the benefits did not prevent the petitioners from observing
their religious beliels."9 Furthermore, the Court considered the burden imposed upon
the exercise of those beliefs by this denial to he outweighed by the government's compel-
ling interest in the eradication of racial discrimination in eclucation.` 40 The IRS's ruling,
therefore, did not unconstitutionally burden petitioners' free exercise of religion, accord-
ing to the Court."'
In summary, the Court found that the IRS acted within its delegated authority to
interpret the Code when it issued the rulings denying tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. The Court further found congressional agreement with,
and ratification of, the IRS's rulings. Finally, the Court determined that denying petition-
ers tax-exempt status did not unconstitutionally burden the free exercise of their religious
beliefs.
B. The Concurrence of Justice Powell
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell found the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status
to the petitioners to be valid, but, unlike the majority, did not base his decision on the
rationale that the IRS had been delegated the authority to make such decisions. Instead,
Justice Powell based his decision on Congress' acceptance and ratification by implication
of the IRS's rulings. 242 Justice Powell pointed out that the language of section 501(c)(3)
2" Id. at 602. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."
"' See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603-04.
237 Id. The Court also dismissed Bob Jones University's argu:ment that by preferring religions
which do not believe that racial intermingling is forbidden, the denial of tax exemptions violates the
establishment clause. Id. at 604 n.30. The Court noted that the IRS's policy is founded on a neutral
secular basis and does not violate the establishment clause because it happens to coincide with the
beliefs of certain religions. Id.
230 Id. at 603. For the purpose of its first amendment analysis the Court did not question that
petitioners' discriminatory policies were based on sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. at 602 n.28.
239 Id. at. 603-04.
240 Id. at 604. The Court further noted that no less restrictive means existed for accomplishing
these governmental objectives. Id.
24' Id. Finally, the Court addressed Bob Jones University's contention that the IRS improperly
applied its policy to them because they were not discriminatory. Id. at 605. The Court summarily
dismissed this contention noting that the University's ban on interracial dating or intermarriage
constituted discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation and association. Id. See supra note 34 for a
definition of racial discrimination, and supra note 26 for a description of Bob Jones University's
discriminatory policies.
242 461 U.S. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring). In this analysis Justice Powell placed particular
emphasis on Congress' enactment of section 501(i) as a basis for legislative ratification by implication
of these rulings. Id. at 607 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). He viewed this action by Congress, taken in
view of the decisions of Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1971) (denying tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools), and McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C.
1972) (allowing racially discriminatory social clubs tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(7)), as an
"affirmative step" expressing Congress' will to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 607 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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did not itself mandate the denial of tax-exempt status to the petitioners.'" In fact, Justice
Powell indicated that he was inclined to accept Justice Rehnquist's view that the express
terms of sections 501(c)(3) and 170 contain the only requirements for organizations
seeking tax exemption under those sections."' Justice Powell, however, did not accept
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of those sections because he concluded that Congress
had agreed with and ratified the IRS's decision that nondiscrimination is an additional
requirement. for receipt of such tax benefits. 2"
Although concurring in the Court's judgment, Justice Powell rejected the Court's
view that. the crucial question in determining tax-exempt status under section 50I(c)(3) is
whether an organization provides a clear "public benefit," as the Court defined that
term. 2" The Court's statements equating "public benefit" with support for the position of
the government or being in harmony with the "community conscience," Justice Powell
asserted, failed to take account of the importance of encouraging diversity of viewpoint in
American society."' As Justice Powell pointed out, tax benefits under these sections had
not generally been meted out only to groups whose views served or were in harmony with
the common community conscience. 248 Justice Powell used this IRS practice of according
tax advantages to a wide variety of organizations, together with the nation's historical
respect for diversity, to support his view that the public benefit provided by these tax
advantages was the encouragement and protection of diversity. 2" Justice Powell stated
that the concern for diversity might not always be dispositive, but that. the IRS was not the
proper body to determine that an organization so violated public policy that it could not
be granted tax-exempt status:25° Such a determination, Justice Powell reasoned, would
require the balancing of the public policy against racial discrimination in education and
the countervailing interests in permitting the practice of unorthodox religious beliefs. 251
2" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted, however, that the
IRS's construction of section 501(c)(3) is not. without logical support. Id. at 607 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell cited the following cases as examples of organizations seeking tax
exemptions that acted in a manner so clearly contrary to public policy that they were disallowed the
sought exemptions: Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 693-94 (1966) (denying the deductibility
as an ordinary and necessary business expense of legal fees incurred in taxpayer's unsuccessful
defense of a prosecution for securities fraud); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
30, 35 (1958) (denying the deductibility as an ordinary and necessary business expense of fines
imposed on truck owners for violations of state maximum weight laws).
244
 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring).
2" Id. at 606-07 (Powell, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 608 (Powell, J., concurring).
"7 Id. at 608-09 (Powell, J., concurring). The petitioners offer secular courses on a wide range of
subjects along with a myriad of other activities which, absent their discriminatory policies, would
clearly serve a "public benefit." The Court's reasoning, therefore, apparently means that the public
benefit provided by petitioners is outweighed by the harmful effects of their discriminatory policies
providing no net public benefit, rather than its purported reasoning that petitioners provide no
public benefit whatsoever. See infra note 295.
249 Id. at 608-09 (Powell, J., concurring). As noted by Justice Powell, arguing that each and every
section 501(c)(3) organization's purpose comports with the common community conscience or even
that they are not "affirmatively at odds with the declared position of the whole government," would
be difficult. Id. at 609 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax
Administration: Religion and Race, 23 CATHOLIC LAWYER 301, 303 (1978) (persons practicing witchcraft
and worshiping pagan dieties accorded tax-exempt status).
2"
 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 609-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
°'0 Id. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring).
25 i See id. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice Powell stated that the balancing of these substantial interests is a task for Congress
alone to perform. 252
Justice Powell reasoned that Congress had fulfilled this balancing function by ratify-
ing the IRS's rulings challenged in this case. 253
 For this reasoniust ice Powell rejected the
Court's reasoning that the IRS was vested with the power to weigh important public
policies and to determine which institutions would be eligible to receive the tax benefits
accorded by sections 501(c)(3) and 170. 254 Justice Powell noted, however, that many
questions remain regarding the permissibility of according tax exemptions to organiza-
tions that violate public policies.`" Congress, Justice Powell believed, should be the body
making such determinations. 2w Consequently, Justice Powell concluded his concurrence
by calling upon Congress to codify its policy regarding tax exemptions for discriminatory
organizations. 257
Thus, Justice Powell concurred with the Court's judgment because he determined
that Congress had ratified the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to discriminatory educa-
tional institutions. He refused to accept, however, the Court's conclusion that section
501(c)(3) contained a "public benefit" requirement mandating that the IRS balance
conflicting public policies to determine tax-exempt status. Justice Powell emphasized the
important nature of the policy decisions being left to the IRS and concluded that such
decisions should rightly be made by Congress, not the IRS.
C. The Dissent of Justice Rehnquist
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court in Bob Jones for two reasons. First, he
disagreed with the Court's construction of section 501(c)(3). 255 Second, he disagreed with
the Court's finding that Congress had ratified the challenged IRS rulings.`'"
In his analysis, Justice Rehnquist first examined the Court's construction of section
501(c)(3), noting that the section did not contain any explicit requirement that an organi-
zation seeking tax-exempt. status be "charitable" as the Court defined that. term.' 6" justice
Rehnquist criticized the Court's use of section 170 to clarify the meaning of section
501(c)(3), 26 ' observing that section 170(c) defines "charitable" contributions by listing the
exempt categories found in section 501(c)(3). 2"' Thus, Justice Rehnquist found section
170 to be of little use in determining the meaning of section 501(c)(3). 2 ' 3
Next, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's inquiry into the legislative history of
"2 Id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring).
2'3 Id. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring).
254 Id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring).
255 Id.-at 612 (Powell, J., concurring).
256 Id.
2" Id.
258 Id. at 612-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 620-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
260 See id. at 613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although the word charitable is found in section
501(0(3), it is only one of the eight enumerated categories of exempt organizations. See id. These
categories are linked by the disjunctive "or" so that on its face section 501(c)(3) does not require that
an organization be "charitable" to qualify as exempt. See id.
28 ' Id. at 613-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 614 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263 Id. The Court, he pointed out, thus presented the circular argument that section 170 shows
that the exemptions in section 501(c)(3) were meant only for charitable organizations, but then
defined charitable organizations as those organizations listed in section 501(c)(3). Id.
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section 501(c)(3). 254 While he agreed with the Court that Congress intended to benefit
organizations providing a public benefit, Justice Rehnquist rejected the Court's reading of
the legislative history of section 501(c)(3), which equated "public benefit" with serving and
being in harmony with the public imerest." 5 To refute the majority's assertion that section
501(c)(3), contains such common-law charitable trust requirements, Justice Rehnquist
developed his own analysis of the legislative history of the section. 26" Justice Rehnquist
traced the history of section 50I(c)(3) from a similar provision in the Tariff Act of 1894,
demonstrating its gradual refinement through the addition of the various exempt catego-
ries. 267 Congress would not have gone through this "arduous refilling process," he rea-
soned, if it had meant to adopt a common-law term of art . 2"" The statutory history of this
section, Justice Rehnquist continued, equally demonstrates that Congress did not intend
to specify some of the requirements for tax exemption u nder section 501(c)(3) and then
allow the IRS or the courts to require listed organizations to meet a higher standard of
public interest. 269 To be exempt under section 501(c)(3), Justice Rehnquist suggested,
requires only that an organization fall wit hin one of the eight. categories specified in that
section and meet its other express requirements. 27" While the IRS is empowered to adopt
regulations to enforce the specified requirements of that section, he concluded, it may not.
act in the place of Congress by adding requirements to those enumerated. 2"
Following his analysis of the requirements of section 501(c)(3), Justice Rehnquist
disputed the Court's conclusion that. Congress had ratified the IRS's interpretation of that.
section. 2" Congress' inaction, he stated, is accorded virtually no weight in determining
legislative intent. 2" According to Justice Rehnquist, the hills and hearings regarding
section 501(c)(3) cited by the Court to show congressional acquiescence showed little more
"' Id. at 614- 15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
265
 See id. See Justice Powell's reasoning that the public benefits which Congress may have wished
to provide were the preservation and encouragement of a pluralistic society and the continuation of
freedom of choice in private philanthropy. Id. at 608-1(1 (Powell, J., concurring).
' 66 Id. at 615-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
257
 Id.
999 Id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"9 Id.
2" Id.
971 Id. Justice Rehnquist was careful to note, however, that while the IRS was not free to add
requirements to section 501(c)(3), it was certainly empowered to interpret the words which are there.
Id. Through this distinction, Justice Rehnquist countered the Court's assertion that absent the
"charitable" requirement the IRS would have to accord tax exemptions to a school for terrorists or
the "Fagin School for Pickpockets." Id. at 617 - 18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Such purposes, Justice
Rehnquist asserted, would not be allowable as tax-exempt even absent an overall charitable require-
ment because they would not come within the IRS's definition of "education" found at 26 C.F.R. §
1,501(c)(3)-(d)(3). 461 U.S. at 618-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The IRS, of course, has the power to
adopt further regulations explaining the meaning of such terms to avoid the misuse of the Code, he
noted. See id.
Justice Rehnquist further noted that the 1RS's abrupt change in its interpretation of section
501(c)(3), made in the face of a preliminary injunction by a district court, suggests that their decision
to reinterpret the section should be given little deference. Id. at 619 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
Court, however, asserted that the IRS's failure to change its interpretation until faced with a
preliminary injunction demonstrates that the agency was hesitant to interfere with individual reli-
gious liberties until the Court clarified the national policy against discrimination and sanctioned such
a move. See id. at 598.
Id. at 620-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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than vigorous debate in Congress on the subject. 274 Justice Rehnquist likewise gave little
credence to the Court's argument that the enactment of section 501(i) by Congress,
regarding discriminatory private clubs, affirmatively manifested congressional acquies-
cence to the IRS's policy relating to educational institutions."' Additionally, Justice
Rehnquist cited legislative history to the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments, 276 referring
to statements of members of Congress proclaiming that the IRS had exceeded its author-
ity in its interpretation of section 501(0(3), as evidence undermining ratification. 277 From
this analysis of Congress' debate, justice Rehnquist concluded that the actions of Congress
regarding the IRS policy were at least ambiguous:278
Finally, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the IRS's construction of the statute was at
odds with its express terms, was contrary to long standing administrative policy, and
vested the IRS with untrammeled and unreviewable power which is usually confined to
Congress. 27 Justice Rehnquist concluded t hat t he Court should be especially cautious in
finding ratification through congressional inaction in these circumstances. 28° Congress has
in the past enacted positive legislation when it wished to do so, Justice Rehnquist argued,
and could have done so in this case if it wished to alter the express requirements of section
501(c)(3). 28 ' The Court's addition of the requirement of nondiscrimination to the section,
Justice Rehnquist concluded, was an impermissible usurpation of Congress' legislative
function. s2
In summary, Justice Rehnquist dissented in Bob Jones because he disagreed with the
Court's inclusion of a requirement that organizations seeking tax benefits under section
501(c)(3) perform a public benefit.. Justice Rehnquist. also disagreed with the Court's
finding that Congress had impliedly ratified the IRS's construction of that section. Finally,
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the Court should be especially hesitant to find ratifica-
tion because such a finding- would result in a construction of section 501(0(3) granting the
IRS powers usually reserved to Congress and would vest the agency with untrammeled
and unreviewable discretion.
"4 Id.
25 Id. at 620-21. Rather, Justice Rehnquist asserted that Congress knew how to add a provision
prohibiting racial discrimination if it wanted to do so. Id.
276 Id. at 621 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Dornan and Ashbrook amendments were passed as
riders to the Treasury Appropriations Act of 1980. Dornan amendment, Treasury, Postal Service,
and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 93 Stat. 559, 577 (1979);
Ashbrook amendment, Pub, L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979). The Dornan amendment
precluded the use of funds made available under the Act for the purposes of carrying out the
proposals in the 1978-79 IRS regulations. See Devins,supra note 183, at 158-61 for a discussion of the
IRS's proposals and Congress' response to the proposals. The Ashbrook amendment precluded the
use of funds by the IRS to "formulate or carry out any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, standard or
measure which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religious, or church operated
schools under section 501(c)(3) of the internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless in effect prior to August
22, 1978."
177 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 621 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
278
	
at 621-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
286
Is' Id. at 621-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
282
	 id, at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court did not reach
the question whether the provision of tax -exempt status to racially discriminatory organizations
violates the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 622 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
He would hold that it does not because the statute itself' is facially neutral. Id.
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE COURT'S APPROACH TO THE DELEGATION ISSUE IN BOB JONES
A. Now the Court's Mode of Analysis Affects Resolution of the Delegation Issue
Two discrete inquiries are involved in resolving the issue in Bob Jones of whether the
IRS's rulings regarding tax exemptions for discriminatory schools were a proper exercise
of its administrative authority.'" First, the Court must determine whether the IRS's
rulings were within the scope of the congressional mandate contained within section
501(c)(3). 284 Second, the Court. must determine whether the authority granted to the IRS
under section 501(c)(3) is itself an excess delegation of thorit y. 285 The Court in Bob Jones
answered the first of these questions affirmatively, finding that the IRS had complied with
the congressional purpose underlying section 501(c)(3) in issuing its rulings. 286 The
analysis of the Court, however, failed to address the second question whether the IRS
could legitimately he vested with the type of authority the Court finds is conferred by
section 501(0(3).
in its analysis of whether the IRS's actions were authorized, the Court focused upon
the correctness of the IRS's 1970 and 1971 rulings.'" To determine the correctness of
these rulings the Court first examined the Internal Revenue Code and the historical
background underlying section 501(c)(3). 2" By so doing, the Court confirmed the IRS's
view that Congress intended that. the section include a "public benefit" requirement
similar to that found in the law of charitable trusts.'" The Court then addressed the
separate question of whet her the IRS correctly determined under this "public benefit"
requirement that educational institutions which discriminating on the basis of race pro-
vide no "public benefit" worthy of tax-exempt status:28" Based on the strong national
public policy against racial discrimination and the IRS mandate to deny tax-exempt status
to organizations which do not comport with public policy, the Court determined that the
1970 and 1971 IRS rulings were authorized by Cong -ress. 281 The Court, therefore, found
the IRS's rulings authorized because the IRS made the correct policy choice — the choice
Congress would have made had it addressed the question.
An authorized act, according to the Court's reasoning, is one that correctly assesses
2" The argument. can be made that the Court's finding of ratification in Bob Jones lessens the
importance of the Court's addressing the delegation question because Congress has in fact made the
decision to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational institutions. The Court,
however, did not base its opinion solely on rat ificat ion. Because of the Court's failure to so restrict its
decision, and because of the implications of the Court's delegation decision, the delegation issue
remains an important part of Bob Jones.
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595-96.
See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595-96.
"' See id. at 595, 598, 599. The Court stated: "There can thus be no question that the
interpretation of §§ 170 and 501(0(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was correct." Id. at 595; "The
actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclusion in
exercising its authority. - Id: at 599; and "The correctness of the Commissioner's conclusion that a
racially discriminatory private school is 'not "charitable" within the common law concepts reflected in
the Code,' ... is wholly consistent with what Congress. the Executive and the courts had
repeatedly declared before 1970." Id. at 598.
2" Id. at 585-92.
2
"9 Id. at 591-92.
2'") Id. at 592-96.
29 ' Id. at 595-96.
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the national policy of benefiting only charitable organizations."' Thus, the Court. concen-
trated on the ends reached by the decision making process rather than the means by which
decisions are made, and ii equated authorized acts withh correct. conclusions. 293
 The
Court's analysis accurately asserted that administrative acts carried out under section
50I(c)(3) that effectuate the legislative purpose of that section are authorized, and that.
acts contrary to the legislative purpose underlying that section are unauthorized, 294 The
Court, however, failed to recognize that an inquiry into whether administrative acts are
within the scope of a statutory delegation is distinct from an inquiry into the legitimacy of
the delegation.
The inclusion of the "public benefit" standard in section 501(c)(3) effectively dele-
gates to the IRS the power to determine which organizations provide a public benefit
worthy of tax-exempt status.'" An inquiry into the I RS's authority under this delegation,
therefore, necessarily involves an examination of whet her the IRS's exercise of authority
itself is proper."9" To answer this question, the Court must. determine whether the
"' See id. at 591-92, 595-96.
293 See supra note 287.
'94 See Wright, supra note 65, at 583.
2" See Bob Janes, 461 U.S. at 597-98. The test proposed by the Court to determine tax-exempt
status under section 501(c)(3) requires the IRS to determine first whether an entity is "charitable" for
the purposes of sections 170 and 501(0(3), and second, if the organization is not "charitable,"
whether it so violated public policy that it may he denied charitable tax -exempt status. Id, at 597-98.
This test apparently separates section 501(0(3) organizations into three separate categories: those
which violate no public policy and are therefore tax-exempt; those which, although they violate
public policy, provide a public benefit which is not outweighed by that violation and are therefore
tax-exempt; and those which violate public policy to such air extent that any benefits provided by the
organization do not outweigh the harm occasioned by the violation and are therefore not tax-
exempt. See id. at 596 n.21, 597-98. Determining whether an organization falls under the second
category, violative of public policy but tax -exempt, or the third category, violative of public policy
and not tax -exempt, necessarily involves a balancing of t he public policies and benefits involved. Both
Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist recognized that this test allows the IRS broad authority to
balance public policies. See id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Court expressly rejected Justice Powell's contention that the public benefit requirement
requires that the IRS determine which public policies are sufficiently fundamental to warrant denial
of tax exemption. Id. at 598 n.23. In response to Justice Powell's criticism, however, [he Court
offered only the unsatisfactory response that Justice Powell's recognition of the fundamental nature
of the national policy against racial discrimination in education and his finding of congressional
ratification demonstrase that the IRS's actions were justified. Id. Thus, the Court again demonstrates
its basic confusion of the difference between authorized acts and correct conclusions. While Justice
Powell's reasoning may support the view that the IRS's conclusion was a proper assessment of the
national policy against racial discrimination and t hat Congress expressed its agreement with the IRS's
decision, it does not indicate agreement with the IRS's exercise of policy making authority. See id. at
601, 611 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court also asserted that because its holding is based on the
conclusion that racially discriminatory private schools do not confer a public benefit, it did not reach
the question whether an organization providing a public benefit and meeting the express require-
ments of section 501(0(3) could be denied tax-exempt status if' sortie of its activities violated law or
public policy. Id. at 596 n.21. The Court's claiin that it restricted its bolding to instances where no
public benefit is provided is questionable. See id. at 608-11 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court's
conclusion that these schools do not provide a public benefit necessarily involved a balancing of the
strength of t he public policy being violated by the schools against any educational benefits conferred
by the schools. See id. at 609, 611 (Powell, J., concurring). By finding no public benefit, the Court
simply concluded that the violation or the public policy against racial discrimination by these
institutions outweighs the public benefit conferred by their educational programs. See id.
296 See supra notes 131-115 and accompanying text,
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inclusion of the public benefit principle in section 501(c)(3) is an excess delegation of
authority to the IRS, not whether the IRS acted as Congress would have had it addressed
the
Because of the failure to recognize the distinction between these two questions, the
Court did not address the delegation issue raised in Bob Jones. The only issue explored by
the Court was whether the outcome of the IRS's actions were correct,'" This result
orientation reduced the Court's role to agreeing or disagreeing with the IRS's construc-
tion of section 501(c)(3), rather than its correct role of assessing whether the IRS's
exercise of authority itself was legitimate.'" Under the Court's approach, excess delega-
tion of authority may not he found. Only when an agency's actions do not comport with
the Court's view of the legislative purpose underlying a delegation would the Court
determine that the actions are unauthorized.'
Additionally, because the Court's analysis in Bob ones was centered on the correctness
of the IRS's conclusions regarding public policy, it never questioned whether section
501(c)(3), as construed, provided standards to guide agency actions and to allow the
courts to assess the legitimacy of future IRS decisions. 3"' An analysis of the Court's
decision reveals that unlike the narrow statutory construction used by the Court in Kent
and National Cable Television Ass'n, the Court's broad statutory construction of section
501(c)(3) in Bob Jones did not insure that a standard exists to limit administrative discre-
tion. 3"' The sole standard to which the IRS must conform in determining whether
organizations provide a public benefit is the general body of public policy.' A given
decision on tax exemption under the Court's interpretation of section 50I(c)(3) may entail
the analysis and balancing of any number of conflicting public policies. 314 The outcome of
this balancing is highly subjective because it involves elevating certain interests, at the
expense of others. In Bob Jones, the Court's interpretation of section 501(c)(3) conferred
broad power on the IRS to balance and limit the important interests of free exercise of
religion and freedom from racial discrimination in education.' The Court's analysis,
however, did not even recognize that first amendment concerns raised by the case had a
role to play in its determination of whet her t he IRS could be invested with authority to
make such decisions.'“'" Instead, the Court's analysis treated the first amendment free
007
 See supra notes 61-115 and accompanying text.
2"" See supra. note 287.
2" See .rupra notes 61-115 and accompanying text.
500 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 585-99.
3"" See id, at 596 -99. The Court noted that IRS determinations should he "[g]uided ... by the
Code," but it failed io state how the Code provides any guidance. Id. at 597.
062 See ,supra. notes 116-149 and accompanying text.
3" See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 611 (Powell, j., concurring).
31' See supra note 295.
3"5 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 610-1 I (Powell, J., concurring). The permissible breadth of a delega-
tion may vary with the importance of the rights affected. See United States v. Robe!, 389 U.S. 258,
275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1957). Like Kent, Bob Jones
involved an agency's infringement of important constitutional rights. While denying tax-exempt
status in Bob Jones restrained the petitioner's free exercise of religion, see Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at
602 -04, granting tax -exempt status would have impinged on the national policy against racial
discrimination. See id. at 592 -96. The collision of these two constitutionally protected interests
emphasizes both the importance and complexity of determining whether an organization serves a
public benefit and increases the necessity of congressional decisionmaking on this issue.
See Bob fortes, 461 U.S. at 596-99.
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exercise questions separately from the issue of IRS authority to make such decisions. 3° 7
Section 501(c)(3) gives no guidance as to which of these important interests should
prevail. 313 By delegating to the IRS the task of determining, without further guidance,
what constitutes a "public benefit," Congress has failed to express a policy choice between
salient alternatives. 319 The IRS is apparently left free to roam about the landscape of
public policy exercising its unconstrained judgment to determine which organizations
are, in its view, beneficial to society and worthy of tax-exempt status. 31° Rather than
providing a standard for agency action, the "public benefit" test in section 501(c)(3)
transfers to the IRS the policymaking function of Congress. 3 "
Both Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, and Justice Powell, concurring, recognized the
problems inherent in the Court's transference of the public benefit determination to the
IRS. Each of these Justices approached the problem of limiting agency discretion in a
different manner.
Although dissenting from the Court's opinion, Justice Rehnquist began his analysis
of Bob Jones, as the Court did, by examining the case as a problem of statutory construe-
tion. 3 " justice Rehnquist, however, attempted to demonstrate that the Court incorrectly
interpreted that section to allow the denial of tax-exempt status to the petitioners because
of their discriminatory policies. 3 ' 3 By statutory construction, justice Rehnquist attempted
to distinguish the process of interpreting the Code, which the IRS is authorized to do,
from the process of enacting additional requirements to the Code, which the IRS is not
permitted to do.'" Justice Rehnquist, therefore, apparently drew the same line the Court
drew between authorized and unauthorized agency actions. Because of his different view
of congressional purpose, however, he reached the opposite result and concluded that the
IRS was acting beyond the scope of its authority. 3 ''
Unlike the Court's construction of section 501(c)(3), however, Justice Rehnquist's
narrow reading of that section implicitly addressed the delegation issues raised in Bob
Jones. Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of section 501(c)(3) restricts that section to its
literal language."' Limiting section 501(c)(3) to its express terms confines the IRS to
determining whether an organization falls within one of the eight listed exempt categories
and meets the political activity and nonprofit requirements specified elsewhere in section
501. 31 The express language of that section provides a clear standard for guiding and
assessing IRS actions. 3 ' 3 This reading of the section also requires that Congress make an
explicit policy choice if it wishes to deny tax exemption to institutions violating particular
J"7 See id. at 602-04.
r"'' See supra note 4 for text of section 501(c)(3).
a° See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring); see also supra notes 88 - 100 and
accompanying text.
" Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring).
3" Id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
" See id. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3L3 See id. at 613 - 17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
See id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
313 Both Justice Rehnquist and the Court concentrate on the question whether the acts fall
within Congress' purpose, rather than whether the acts are the type which Congress alone has the
institutional competence to perform. Compare id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) with Id. at 586-88,
591.92, 595-96.
310 See id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
317 Id.
3jB Id.
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public policies. 319 This construction thus prevents abdication by Congress of its policy
making function. 32"
Both Kent and National Cable Television Ass'n demonstrate the usefulness of strict
statutory construction in addressing overbroad delegations."' Justice Rehnquist, how-
ever, did not expressly state that his narrow reading of section 501(c)(3) was mandated by
the importance of the first amendment interests involved in Bob Jones or was required
because a broad reading of that section would create an impermissible delegation of
authority to the IRS. Thus, the argument can he made that Justice Rehnquist's narrow
reading of 50 I (c)(3) is unrelated to the concerns expressed by the delegation doctrine and
is simply based on his different view of the legislative history underlying the section. 3"
Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the ratification issue, discussed in the final section of this
casenote, however, raises delegation issues which may arguably also provide the basis for
his narrow reading of the section. 323
 Whether or not Justice Rehnquist considered the
broad authority the IRS exercised to be the basis for his narrow construction of section
501(c)(3), his analysis implicitly addressed these concerns by providing a clear standard to
guide agency action and by requiring Congress to make an express policy choice. 324
Justice Powell's analysis in Bob Jones differed from the statutory construction analysis
used by both t he Court and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell, like justice Rehnquist, did
express doubts about. whether the legislative history of section 501(c)(3) implies that.
organizations seeking tax exemption must fulfill a public benefit requirement as the Court
defines thât term. 3" Justice Powell's analysis, however, was not centered on statutory
construction. 326 Instead, Justice Powell focused on the nature of the power vested in the
IRS under the Court's construction of section 501(0(3) to demonstrate why that construc-
tion is incorrect. 327
 He suggested that the balancing of important policy interests is not
typically a function of the IRS and that the IRS should he limited to areas in which it has
experience. 328
 The Court's decision, he concluded, puts the IRS on the "cutting edge of
determining national policy," a job which Congress is responsible for performing. 329
Justice Powell's emphasis on Congress' role as a policymaking body and the unsuita-
bility of the IRS to make policy decisions shows a recognition of the role of institutional
competence in analyzing delegation questions. 33" The Court's construction of section
501(c)(3) was impermissible in his view because it assigned tasks to the IRS which the
agency was not competent to handle. 33 ' Thus, Justice Powell addressed the fundamental
question whether the "public benefit" requirement, which both the IRS and the Court
319 See id. at 612-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32" See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 116-149 and accompanying text.
3y2 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 612-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
333 Compare id. (justice Rehnquises narrow statutory construction), with Kent, supra notes 118-29
and accompanying text, and National Cable Television Ass'n, supra notes 130-48 and accompanying
text.
"4 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 612-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"23 Id. at 606, 608-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
"" See id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
'27 Id.
"" Id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring).
329
	
at 612 (Powell, J., concurring).
II" Compare id, at 611 - 12 (Powell, J., concurring), with id. at 585 -99; see also supra notes 84 - 100
and accompanying text.
333 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 611 & n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
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found implicit. in section 501(c)(3), was itself an excess delegation of authority."' He
found that this requirement was an excess delegation of authority to the IRS and
therefore refused to read such a requirement into section 501(c)(3), 3" Although Justice
Powell did not expressly so state, from his reasoning it. might be inferred that he believes
certain powers, like the power to determine basic public policy affecting substantial
interests, are not delegable."' In Rob Jones Justice Powell alone recognized the role
institutional competence should play in limiting delegations."' His reasoning demon-
strates how the competence of the agency in question, the type of power conferred, the
unique role of Congress in the national government, and the importance of individual
interests all should come into play when assessing the legitimacy of a delegation. 33"
B. The. Ratification Question as It Relates to Delegation
In addition to finding that the IRS correctly interpreted section 501(c)(3) as preclud-
ing the grant of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools, the Court in Bob Jones
discussed congressional reaction to these rulings.'" The Court concluded that Congress
agreed with  the IRS's rulings and impliedly ratified those rulings by its failure to overturn
them. 338 Rather than evidencing a delegation to the IRS of the power to decide public
policy, ratification involves some quantum of congressional decisionmaking on the issue
of denying lax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational institutions. 339 Such a
finding of congressional decisionmaking might. remove from consideration the delegation
issue in Bob Jones. Unlike justice Powell, however, the Court did not base its decision solely
on the ground of congressional ratification of the I RS's rulings.'" Because of the Court's
failure to restrict its decision, the delegation issue remains an important part ofBohJones.
Congressional ratification of an administrative decision shows only that Congress
agreed with the ends reached by that agency. 3" Ratification does not answer the question
whether Congress had the right to transfer to the administrative agency the authority to
make the original decision in question. 347 The determination of whether Congress has
rightly delegated authority to an administrative agency must be made by the courts, not
Congress.'" Thus, the Court's finding of congressional ratification of the IRS's rulings
did not address the delegation concerns inherent in its discussion of IRS authority.
Like the Court's treatment of the delegation issue in Bob Jones, the Court's finding of
congressional ratification of the IRS's rulings may also be criticized on the basis of
Congress' intended role in the national government. The difference between legislative
action and inaction is quite important. Legislative action expresses an explicit choice after
m See id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
333 See id.
334 See Id.; see also supra notes 84.100 and accompanying text.
an See 461 U.S. at 611 - 12 (Powell, J., concurring); see also supra notes 84-100 and accompanying
text.
336 461 U.S. at 611 - 12 (Powell, J., concurring).
"aT See id. at 599 - 602.
336 Id.
3" See id.; see also id. at 607-08 (Powell, J., concurring).
a" See id. at 577 -605.
3" See id. at 607 -08 (Powell, J., concurring).
3" See id. at 599-602; id. at 608-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
343 See Wright, supra note 65, at 581.
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clue consideration of an issue." The inaction in Bob Jones, however, could he interpreted
either as agreement with the IRS's rulings or as an inability to agree whether those rulings
were correct:143
 If Congress' inaction was the result of disagreement. leading to paralysis,
the IRS has made a public policy decision that Congress likely would not have made.""
Alternately, if the inaction is the product of congressional approval, Congress has hardly
carried out its full responsibility to form and direct national public
Seen in light. of the possible reasons for legislative inaction, the enactment of section
501(i) by Congress denying tax-exempt status to private social clubs does not confirm
what Congress would do with respect to section 501(0(3). 34" Even though the enactment.
of section 501(i) evidences Congress' strong position against racism, that section does not
address the problem of the conflict between religious beliefs and the policy against. racial
discrimination."" This issue, by its very nature, is more difficult to address than the issue
of whether private social clubs practicing racial discrimination should be accorded tax-
exempt. status. The problem of uncertainty surrounding legislative activity which does not
result in a positive enactment is illustrated by Justice Rehnquist's determination that
Congress' actions regarding the challenged IRS rulings are at least ambiguous."' Justice
Rehnquist's view that congressional inaction should be given "virtually no weight" in
determining legislative intent is hardly surprising in view of these probiems. 35 '
These problems with inferring congressional intent from its inaction raise the ques-
tion whether justice Powell's finding of ratification in Bob Jones can he reconciled with his
view that Congress must. he the author of public policy. While Justice Powell's finding of
ratification allowed the IRS a role in the formation of policy, that role is limited to the
instant case. 352 Justice Powell made clear that he does not believe that the IRS has the
authority to make such decisions in the future. 353 Moreover, by calling for congressional
action to codify its policy regarding racial discrimination in education, Justice Powell
further emphasized his concern that decisionmaking take place in the proper institu-
tions. 354 Thus, although Justice Powell's finding of ratification in Bob Jones did not require
Congress to live up to its full responsibility of making express choices between salient
alternatives within the body of a statute, his analysis did emphasize that Congress must
make the decision in some fashion. 353 Unlike Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell viewed the
actions of Congress in the case to be an extremely strong showing of congressional
decisionmaking which, while not procedurally ideal, is adequate to fulfill their policymak-
ing function relating to section 50 1(c)(3).' Justice Powell's position of ratification is,
therefore, not wholly inconsistent. with his delegation arguments.
Unlike the Court or Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist concluded that delegation
concerns, along with the inherent weakness of finding ratification by inaction, should
3" See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
345 See Wright, supra note 65, at 584 -85.
"" See id.
3" See supra notes 66-100 and accompanying text.
349 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 601-02.
349 See supra note 230 for text of section 501(i).
35" See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 621-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35'
	 id. at 620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"' See id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
333
3" Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring).
3" Id. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring).
35"
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prevent a finding of congressional ratification in Bob jones. 357 This position may be
explained by Justice Rehnquist's fundamentally different view of what the Court in Bob
Jones found that Congress had ratified. justice Powell viewed the Court's action as
verifying the IRS's specific determination that Congress did not intend tax benefits to be
accorded to racially discriminatory educational institutions under section 50 1(c)(3)."8
Justice Rehnquist, however, saw the Court as confirming the IRS's finding that Congress
had included a public benefit. requirement in section 501(c)(3). 3" Thus, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that by finding ratification the Court is, in effect, reading the pbblic benefit
requirement. into section 501(c)(3) and making a delegation to the IRS which Congress
has not made.' This conclusion led him to express delegation concerns in his discussion
of ratification not raised in his statutory construction analysis.
In his discussion of the Court's finding of ratification, justice Rehnquist expressed
concern that the IRS's construction of this statute vests in that agency "virtually untram-
meled" and "unreviewable" power — power usually reserved to Congress."' Because of
the nature and extent of the power such a reading would vest in the IRS, he argued, the
Court should he hesitant to find ratification through congressional inaction.'" Justice
Rehnquist d id nor argue that Congress could not delegate such power to the IRS. Instead,
he maintained that the Court should he reluctant. to infer such a delegation without
express language.'" This argument did not extend as far as justice Powell's reasoning
arguably did in limiting Congress' right to transfer policymaking power to the IRS. 364
Justice Rehnquist's requirement that. a delegation be express, in effect, remanded the
delegation decision to Congress to insure that it. intended that the IRS should have this
broad authorit.y. 31 ' Justice Rehnquist was not required to reach the ultimate question
'whether Congress could delegate such power due to his initial finding that Congress
made no delegation to the IRS to balance public benefits in determining tax-exempt
mat us.""
Whether Justice Rehnquist's concerns regarding the nature and extent of the power
transferred to the IRS would lead him to strike clown or limit an explicit congressional
delegation is uncertain. In prior decisions, he has indicated a willingness to strike down
overbroad delegations. 3" In tandem with Justice Powell's reasoning placing an absolute
limit on certain delegations due to concerns of institutional competence, Justice Rehn-
quist's approach provides a useful technique which the Court should use to prevent
unconsidered and overbroad delegations in the future.
47 See id. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"" See id. at 606-07, 612 (Powell, J., concurring).






51'4 See supra notes 330-36 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 116-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kent and National Cable
Television Ass'n.
3" See Bab Jones, 461 U.S. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf: supra notes 116 -49 and accom-
panying text (discussion of Kent and National Cable Television Ass'n).
"7 See supra note 67.
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CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution is not. merely a means to an end, but is a binding
relationship of offices and powers. This relationship ensures t he proper functioning of
the national government in which Congress is the author of fundamental public policy.
While the results of the political process are not always ideal, the process itself is impor-
tant. This concern for the process as opposed to ends is the principle underlying the
delegation doctrine.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Bob Jones emphasized this concern for process by
stating that policy formation should take place in Congress, not in the IRS. Recognizing
Congress' unique institutional competence to make major public policy decisions, Justice
Powell refused to find that Congress granted the IRS the authority to base tax exemptions
on the broad public benefit requirements outlined by the Court. Justice Powell, however,
found that. Congress had fulfilled its role by impliedly expressing a policy choice regard-
ing the permissibility of extending tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools.
Thus, while not mandating express congressional decisionmaking in Bob Jones, Justice
Powell's approach serves the useful purpose of requiring t hat Congress assume the role as
author of fundamental public policy in the future.
Justice Rehnquist. took a different approach to the delegation issue presentee! in Bob
Jones. Delegation concerns were raised by Justice Rehnquist. in his discussion of ratifica-
tion, in part because of his view that the Court's finding of ratification in effect delegated
untrammeled authority to the IRS to make public policy choices in the future. By his
refusal to find ratification in congressional inaction, Justice Rehnquist emphasized the
importance of express acts by Congress as a basis for delegations. Further, his narrow
statutory construction of section 501(c)(3), while not expressly based on a concern for
process, served the delegation doctrine's purpose of preventing standardless delegations
of legislative authority. The Court's earlier decisions in Kent v. Dulles and National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States demonstrated the usefulness of such a strict statutory
construction in preventing overbroad delegations. Both of these Justices, therefore,
offered useful approaches to limiting Congress' ability to abdicate its decisionmaking
function.
The Court, by contrast, neither limited its holding to a finding of congressional
ratification, nor provided guidelines to check the broad policymaking power its interpre-
tation of section 501(c)(3) transfers to the IRS. instead, by continually referring to the
correctness of the IRS assessment of national policy, the Court emphasized the end result.
of the decisionmaking process rather than the process itself. By failing to address the
propriety of the decisionmaking process leading to t he "correct - result, the Court in Bob
Jones evaded the delegation issue considered by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, The
Court's analytical framework belied its conclusion, and the delegation doctrine was
irrelevant. to its analysis. The Court's failure to apply the delegation doctrine to limit. the
transfer of congressional power to the IRS allowed Congress to abdicate its proper role as
the :1111 hot' of fundamental public policy in the United States. Allowing such delegations
undermines the system of government envisioned by the Founders and embodied in the
Constitution.
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